ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION: THE OVERLOOKED PROBLEM OF PATENT BULLYING
In the last ten years or so, academics, the media, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Supreme Court have been fixated on so-called "patent trolls"-loosely, entities and individuals that generate the bulk of their revenue from patent litigation and licensing, but do not make and sell products that embody their patents and that, typically, perform little to no research and development relating to their patents. 1 Yet, the exact problem trolls present to the patent system has remained somewhat elusive. 2 Many focus their attention on the non-practicing nature of trolls, exhorting that patentholders that do not sell commercial products embodying their patents are behaving contrary to the goals of the patent system. 3 1 Some might characterize individual inventors or small companies that had once performed research and development, but no longer do, as patent trolls. In general, there is a substantial debate over how to define the term "troll," but all definitions appear to require that a troll not make and sell products (at least in substantial numbers) that embody the patents it owns. [14] [15] [16] [17] 2013 ), available at http://www.laipla.net/wp-content/ uploads/2013/11/CotropiaEtAlStudy.pdf (proposing a multi-category classification system for PAEs and finding lower numbers of PAE suits in 2010 and 2012 than previously reported in the literature). For the reasons I present below, I think the term "troll" is justified, but only for those NPEs that abuse the patent system by exploiting weak patents. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. In this regard, the current shift in terminology may do more injustice to those NPEs and PAEs that assert strong patents-which I generally view as welfare-enhancing-than retaining the use of the "troll" term.
2 Following the dissemination of this Article online, Mark Lemley and Douglas Melamed offered a trenchant critique of the common rhetoric of patent trolls. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129-45 (2013) (citing an earlier version of this Article) (contending that, in many respects, practicing entities potentially generate more social costs than trolls). However, in contrast to this Article, Lemley and Melamed do not focus their efforts on describing how large practicing entities abuse the patent system by "bullying" smaller practicing entities. Instead, they ground their analysis in a comparison of the activities of practicing entities to those of non-practicing entities. See id.
3 See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010) ("Patent-assertion entities are focused on the enforcement, rather than the active development or commer-However, this view is clearly wrong, at least as a descriptive matter, because the Supreme Court has firmly held that "it is the privilege of any owner of property [including patents] to use or not use it, without question of motive." 4 Indeed, the most widely accepted explanation of the patent system-the "reward theory"-posits that patents are designed to spur invention and its disclosure in patents to the public, but generally are unnecessary to promote the commercialization of inventions. 5 Instead, reward theorists believe that once inventions are created and disclosed, the market will efficiently yield commercial embodiments of those inventions. 6 Although there is a strong normative argument that the patent system should actively promote commercialization-and I am squarely in favor of this view-American 551-52 (2014) . Moreover, although post-eBay denials of injunctions to non-practicing entities may be effectuating more of a commercialization-oriented view of patent law, on a theoretical level, Justice Kennedy's pronouncement is analytically flawed, because he implicitly assumes without basis that non-practicing entities enjoy "undue leverage in negotiations" involving complex technologies while practicing entities do not. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Whether a patentee is practicing or not, an injunction may suboptimally diminish the social incentives to commercialize, because the patentee can often gain more leverage in negotiations than is attributable to the social value of the patent. See Sichelman, supra, at 545-52. One might argue that non-practicing entities tend to gain greater "undue" leverage than practicing entities-for example, because they are repeat players and relatively risk-neutralbut these fine distinctions played no role in Justice Kennedy's conclusory assertions. eBay, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). (2004) (contending that there is no need for patent rights to encourage ex post activity, in particular, "further investment in the improvement, maintenance, or commercialization of the product"). patent law has long shied away from this approach. 7 Thus, under current law, trolls not commercializing their inventions can scarcely justify the views of those aligned against them. 8 Another oft-touted criticism of trolls is that they perform little to no research and development (R&D) on their patents. 9 Yet, this view seems as odd as the commercialization concern. Patents have always been tradable, either through outright sale or licensing, 10 and nobody would argue that only the original inventor should be able to sue for infringement. 11 7 See Sichelman, supra note 5, at 343-44 ("The dominant 'reward' theory of patenting, which undergirds much of today's law, perceives little to no need to protect risky and costly post-invention development and commercialization efforts.").
8 Some defendants make a more nuanced argument regarding trolls' lack of commercial activity-namely, that trolls thwart accused infringers' efforts to defend against infringement lawsuits by eliminating defendants' ability to assert infringement counterclaims so as to spur settlement. See WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32996, PATENT REFORM: INNOVATION ISSUES 9 (2005) ("Because patent speculators do not otherwise participate in the marketplace, however, they are immune to such counterclaims."). But the only policy reasons in favor of promoting these kinds of counterclaims would be to lower the social costs of defending against "bad" patents, or simply costs arising from other systemic defects, neither of which is endemic to "patent trolls. Although trolls themselves might not perform R&D, the inventors listed on the patents presumably did, so saying that trolls thwart the patent system because they undertake no R&D is not much different from saying GE thwarts the patent system, because only its engineers-who assign their patents to their employer, GE-perform research. 12 Rather, from the perspective of contemporary economics, there is little difference between a vertically integrated entity like GE and an effective joint venture between independent inventors and a troll assignee-indeed, the joint ventures are often more efficient means of producing inventions. 13 In sum, the two key features of trolls as they are commonly definednamely, that they do not commercialize their patents and perform little to no R&D-are red herrings when it comes to the problems they create for the patent system, at least on the widely accepted, reward theory of patent law. 14 Rather, the major concern over trolls seems to stem from their single-minded 14 As noted earlier, if one views the patent system as important to promoting commercialization, then trolls' failure to make and sell products embodying their patents is certainly a serious problem. See supra text accompanying notes 5-7. But only a minority of scholars and judges hold such a view. See Sichelman, supra note 5, at 358-62, 393 (describing the widespread "reward" theory of patents, which eschews commercialization of invention as an appropriate aim for the patent system and offering an alternative "commercialization" theory); see also Michael Abramowicz & John Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 408 (2008) ("In general, we believe that the proposed modification of the patent system to allow for some 'commercialization' patents holds sufficient promise that it should be considered in cases where the hurdles to commercialization seem particularly daunting."); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 707 (2001) ("Any system focused on rewarding inventive effort, when an actual good or service is brought to the market, runs the risk of failing to address the activities that take place after an invention is made but before it can be profitably exploited." (emphasis omitted)); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 159, 177 (1942) (contending that the "aspect of inducement [of the patent laws that] is by far the greatest in practical importance . . . might be called the inducement to risk an attempt to commercialize the invention").
goal of earning revenue from patent litigation and licensing. 15 This quest for patent-induced profits appears to channel many trolls into aggressively exploiting defects in patent examination, licensing, and litigation in ways that other patentholders often do not. 16 Indeed, on this view, the term "troll" should be limited only to-and is well deserved for-those non-practicing entities that abuse the patent system. 17 However, to be certain, any patentholder can-and many do-take advantage of these systemic defects. 18 There are at least four serious defects in the patent system. First, although the empirical research is limited, it appears the Patent Office issues many patent claims that are arguably anticipated or obvious in view of prior technology; overly broad given the scope of the patent disclosure; vague, ambiguous, and generally difficult to interpret; and introduced and amended long after the original patent disclosure is filed. 19 Despite the seemingly endless number of "bad" patents, there is a "[p]resumption of validity" that patents are properly granted, 20 which makes invalidating them in litigation quite costly-usually a million dollars or more. 21 Second, patentees and potential infringers face unusually high transaction costs in licens- 15 See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 2, at 2170 ("Trolls are opportunists that exploit flaws in the patent system."); see also Sichelman, supra note 5, at 368 (noting that NPEs "tend to exploit litigation and licensing market defects to extract unwarranted rents from commercializers").
16 22 The distorting effects of these costs are especially problematic in technological fields for which patent search and analysis are difficult. 23 Third, patentholders can delay assertions of infringement until a relevant market is well developed and the costs of switching to a non-infringing technology are exorbitant. 24 Fourth, asymmetric resources, stakes, and levels of risk-aversion between repeat players, such as trolls and large patentholders versus one-time players, such as startup companies, can result in highly skewed litigation outcomes, especially when substantial damages are at stake. 25 Although trolls appear to be especially adept at exploiting these defects, they are not the only group doing so. Another important class of patentholders-namely, large practicing entities that often hold many patents-appear to be exploiting the same sorts of defects, and potentially, at much greater rates. 26 Just like the trolls, these "patent bullies" take full advantage of weak, uncertain, and vague patents; the high costs of litigation; the ability to delay lawsuits; and their massive resources in order to engage in highly anticompetitive behavior, often against market entrants and startups. 27 Specifically, patent bullies assert their patents against entrants to prenizing the difficulties of revoking invalid patents in the face of extremely high litigation costs, running from $500,000 to $3 million per suit 28 Additionally, bullies desiring to enter a new market wield their patents against startups that are already well positioned in the market. 29 In particular, a patent bully can file an infringement suit to compel a license from a startup to its innovative technology-which, in turn, the bully uses to trounce the startup by leveraging pre-established production capacity, marketing channels, and general goodwill, as well as by engaging in effective predatory pricing by tying the innovative product to the sale of preexisting products. 30 These effects are often compounded by keiretsu-style, cross-licensing agreements among industry incumbents, which provide a veritable zone of freedom to the incumbents, but a wall of impenetrability to entrants. 31 The remainder of this Article provides an in-depth description and analysis of the patent bullying problem by undertaking a case study of a trilogy of suits filed by incumbent telecommunications carriers against Vonage Hold- 29 See Graham & Sichelman, supra note 25, at 1077 ("Thus, if a patentee spots a startup using its patented technology and desires a license to the start-up's patents-except in the very unlikely event that the start-up has a significant portfolio to cross-license-the start-up would presumably provide a payment (either up-front, as an on-going royalty, or both) to the patentee as part of the cross-licensing agreement."). ings Company (Vonage), an early-stage company that provides consumer telephone services over the Internet. 32 By evaluating the decisions of Vonage's and Sprint's counsel in the context of the patents-in-suit, accused technology, prior art, and hired experts, this Article offers an atypical, "law in action" approach 33 for assessing the defects of the present patent system. 34 Such a mode of inquiry is radically different from not only the doctrinally oriented analyses that generally ignore the effects of counsel on case outcomes and judicial opinions, but also the high-level empirical analyses that tend to abstract away from the day-to-day decisions of parties, lawyers, and judges. 35 More concretely, this Article examines how Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T filed suits to prevent Vonage from continuing to gain market share from the carriers with its disruptive, Internet-based, consumer telephony services. 36 Although it appears that all or nearly all of the patents-in-suit were very likely not infringed, invalid, or unenforceable, Vonage had comparatively limited resources and lacked the experience to vigorously and skillfully defend 32 See infra Section I.A (describing Vonage's history and services). 33 Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910) ("But if we look closely, distinctions between law in the books and law in action, between the rules that purport to govern the relations of man and man and those that in fact govern them, will appear, and it will be found that today also the distinction between legal theory and judicial administration is often a very real and a very deep one. against these suits. 37 As a result, it paid more than $200 million in settlement payments to the carriers. 38 Ultimately, Vonage's seemingly unwarranted settlement payments placed it at the brink of insolvency-drastically reducing its stock price and severely weakening its position in the market. 39 Perhaps more importantly, the outcome of the Vonage trilogy-which was widely publicized in the mainstream media-has provided a strong signal to incumbents that patent litigation, even when the underlying case is weak, can be an effective tool to quash competition. 40 Despite the serious nature of patent bullying, scant attention has been paid to it in the popular press and academic literature, especially in recent years. 41 Arguably, the paucity of discussion of patent bullying stems in large part from certain practicing entities effectively diverting attention away from their own exploitative behavior by placing the blame on so-called "non-practicing entities" (NPEs) and "patent assertion entities" (PAEs), often taken to be synonymous with "patent trolls." 42 Although I do not contend that abu-37 See Blevins, supra note 36, at 117-21, 131-32 (explaining how industry observers generally viewed the incumbents' suits as weak). One might ask how Vonage was able to pay the $200 million in settlement amounts if "it had comparatively limited resources to . . . vigorously defend against these suits." As I explain below, Vonage was sued during a period of rapid revenue growth of roughly 300% annually. See infra Section I.A. Specifically, at the time of the first suit, Vonage's annual revenue was likely around $200 million per year, but by the time of the first settlement, it had grown to about $800 million per year. 40 See infra Conclusion (explaining how relatively weak suits filed by patent bullies can cause substantial economic harm by diminishing competition); see also Blevins, supra note 36, at 118 ("In addition to the sheer amount of damages Vonage had to pay, the litigation sent a significant and cautionary signal to the market. Like all new startups, independent VoIP companies relied on attracting investors. The litigation, however, substantially increased the risks of investing in any independent VoIP company."); id. at 119 (noting that, while Vonage had problems apart from the patent litigation, "the patent litigation threat posed [the most] serious and even existential threat" as evidenced by the fact that "Vonage's most serious signs of weakness tended to correlate closely in time with Vonage's fortunes in the patent litigation").
41 sive behavior by trolls should be condoned, it should be viewed in the light of rampant abusive behavior by non-practicing and practicing entities alike. 43 The Vonage case study presented herein indicates that as "patent bullies," practicing entities can engage in similar levels of abuse as the non-practicing trolls. 44 I. THE GENESIS, SUCCESS, AND BULLYING OF VONAGE This Part begins by recounting the genesis of Vonage in 2000 and its rapid growth over the next five years. Next, it describes the suits filed against Vonage by Sprint, Verizon, and AT&T, including an in-depth analysis of the patents and technologies at issue in the Sprint case. In so doing, I conclude that Vonage failed to raise (or waived) potentially determinative defenses in the Sprint case, which it settled for roughly $80 million. 45 In analyzing the Sprint case in detail, I do not mean to convey that Sprint's tactics during litigation per se were "bullying"-rather, my aim is to show that although Sprint's claims were weak at best, it was nonetheless able to force Vonage to pay $80 million. 46 The ability of large patentees to extract sizable payments from smaller companies on patents of highly dubious merit is exemplative of the systemic abuse present in today's patent system. 47 Last, I examine several suits filed against Vonage by ostensible "trolls," as well as a suit Vonage "acquired" that was directed against the incumbent carriers. 48 In general, I conclude that the patent system was not effective for Vonage as a plaintiff-and, more importantly-afforded ample opportunity for patent bullying of Vonage by industry incumbents, with results far worse than those inflicted on Vonage by the trolls. 49 As a preliminary matter, the reader might wonder whether a legal academic is suitably positioned to play "Monday morning quarterback" in evaluating the decisions of lawyers in cases involving highly complex technologies and spanning several years and hundreds of pleadings. 50 Normally, the answer to this question would be an indubitable "no." However, in this situation, I believe the answer is a qualified "yes." Specifically, before practicing as a patent litigator, I founded and ran a software communications company that sold Voice over IP (VoIP) systems that included technology similar to lobbying Congress to curb their ability to threaten product manufacturers."); supra note 1 (citing sources discussing PAEs).
43 See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 541-54 (describing how practicing entities can cause holdup problems in essentially the same manner as NPEs that used by Vonage. 51 In this regard, I was heavily involved in the design, development, and installation of my company's VoIP-related products. 52 Additionally, I represented Vonage in its action against AT&T-albeit briefly, as the case settled shortly after filing-and also represented Skype, the largest provider of VoIP services in the world, in two unrelated patent infringement actions. As part of my professional and legal work, I have become quite familiar with the types of VoIP technologies employed by Vonage, including prior art relevant to the patents-in-suit in the Vonage trilogy. Although I have not read every pleading in detail in the Sprint casenor do I even have access to all of them, as many were filed under seal-in drafting this Article, I spent numerous hours reading the patents-in-suit, pleadings, and orders, as well as searching for and reviewing potential prior art. Although I can legitimately convince only those intimately familiar with the facts of the case of the correctness of my conclusions, hopefully the analysis presented herein will inform any reader of the weakness of Sprint's suit and the critical omissions Vonage made in defense. 53 
A. Traditional Telephony and the Birth of Vonage
Up until the mid-1990s, voice-based telephone communications comprised a combination of traditional "circuit switched" (effectively analog) networks-often known collectively as the "public switched telephone network" (PSTN)-and private "packet-based" (effectively digital) networks, which were typically used to carry long-distance traffic between local "relay" points connected to the PSTN. 54 With the rise of the Internet, a number of compa- 59 With a large variety of cost-affordable and reliable gateways available, a number of Internet telephony companies were founded to offer consumers standard telephone services that used the Internet to substantially reduce the costs of carrying long-distance calls. 60 The fastest growing of these companies in the early 2000s was Vonage Holdings Company. 61 lion subscribers, a number that was growing at over 300% per year. 62 The driver behind Vonage's phenomenal growth and revenue was its ability to offer "unlimited" local and long-distance calling on any ordinary telephone for about $40 per month. 63 Although Vonage's calls are carried over the Internet, a user simply plugs an adapter into an ordinary phone and connects it to a router-and with some minimal installation-starts placing calls in a manner essentially indistinguishable from a traditional phone service. 64 Thus, Vonage was not simply an add-on, but an entire replacement, for the services offered by the incumbent carriers. 65 Not only were carriers losing many subscribers and substantial revenue to Vonage in the mid-2000s, they were implicitly funding Vonage's low-cost service because they built and maintained most of the underlying network for the Internet in the United States. 66 Although the carriers were paid by their subscribers for their use of the Internet, because landline data plans in the United States typically provided (and still provide) for unlimited data transmission and downloads, the carriers were effectively subsidizing Vonage's discounts. 67 Moreover, by providing its services over the "preexisting" Internet, Vonage was able to avoid being classified as a traditional telephone service, which allowed it to escape burdensome regulation and taxes. 68 As such, the incumbent carriers were presumably highly motivated to find any way to prevent Vonage from expanding its subscriber base.
B. The Vonage Trilogy

Sprint v. Vonage
In October 2005, Sprint filed an infringement suit on seven patents against Vonage in the District of Kansas. 69 In terms of relative resources-and using the end of 2005 as a benchmark-Sprint had 430 U.S. patents, 70 $35 billion in revenue, $1.8 billion in net profits, 60,000 employees, and 48 million customers, 71 while Vonage had no issued patents, 72 $269 million in revenue, $262 million in net losses, 1355 employees, and 1.27 million customers. 73 Notably, Vonage's lack of a patent portfolio (by definition) precluded it from the preferred tactic of "defending" against suit by asserting its patents back against Sprint. 74 Indeed, as recounted in more detail below, Vonage settled the case after purchasing a set of patents that Sprint was accused of infringing in another case. 75 The seven patents-in-suit all disclosed technological systems and methods to route voice traffic on a traditional telephone network-i.e., the "public switched telephone network" (PSTN)-to and from a digital, packet-based network that uses an "asynchronous transfer mode" (ATM), non-Internet protocol. 76 Like so-called "patent trolls," Sprint admitted in its interrogatories that it never practiced the patents, though there was some evidence that Cisco Systems, Inc. was a licensee of the patents-in-suit, and that Cisco sold products that could be used in practicing the patents. 77 In this regard, one critical fact in the case was that Vonage purchased most of its communica-tions equipment from Cisco, which led to potential defenses I explore below. 78 Because the specifications of the patents-in-suit disclosed carrying voice traffic over an ATM-based network, as opposed to the Internet, claim construction revolved around whether Sprint's patents could cover an IP network. 79 In this regard-like savvy trolls-Sprint filed an original patent application, which it abandoned, then filed a series of "continuation" applications, including those that resulted in the seven patents-in-suit. 80 By using continuations, Sprint was able to rely on the filing date of its original application for new claims that purported to cover non-ATM networks. 81 Indeed, Sprint's earliest-issued patent claims are limited to ATM networks, 82 while its later patents removed this limitation, presumably in an attempt to reach IP networks like those used by Vonage. 83 Importantly, because Sprint's later patent applications were entitled to rely on the 1994 filing date of the original application, all of the developments in the field of Internet telephony between then and the late 1990s (the actual filing date of the patents-in-suit) 78 were excluded from the set of potential prior art that could be used to invalidate the patents. 84 Although Vonage was able to win a key claim construction battle that limited the literal scope of many of the asserted claims to ATM networks, as I recount below, it apparently failed to mount arguments that would have probably given it a winning defense of non-infringement for three of the seven patents under the doctrine of equivalents. 85 In addition to Vonage's failure to limit the patents to ATM networks-despite the seemingly wide array of prior art available to it and strong evidence showing the inventor of the patents never considered his invention to apply to IP networks 86 -it did not move for many defenses of invalidity on summary judgment, including anticipation and obviousness, 87 and was unsuccessful in showing invalidity at trial. 88 Finally, Vonage waived the potentially decisive defenses of "implied license" and "exhaustion" by waiting to assert them until the last day of discovery. 89 Taken together, these omissions arguably turned Sprint's seemingly "weak" case into an effectively "strong" one.
Part of Vonage's failure to mount these defenses presumably stemmed from the inexperience of its experts, who-as I explain below-appeared relatively unfamiliar with the technology-at-issue. 90 Of course, ultimately it is counsel who is responsible for selecting experts, gathering evidence, and mounting a case. Yet, according to the court and all other indicators, Vonage's counsel was quite experienced in patent litigation matters. 91 Thus, one might surmise that Vonage's omissions and waivers-some of them quite serious-resulted more from a lack of time and resources, rather than skill, 84 See id. at 12, ¶ 48 ("Sprint was amending its claims at the same time market analysis predicted industry developments making internet telephony a real challenge."); see also Lemley & Moore, supra note 81, at 66-68 (explaining how continuation applications are entitled to the benefit of the original filing date, thereby excluding prior art between the date the original application is filed and the date the continuation is filed). 89 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1347 ("Vonage contended that the belated amendment was justified because Vonage had only recently come into possession of a contract between Sprint and Cisco, the terms of which include licenses, covenants not to sue, and other terms that Vonage contended may bar Sprint's claims against Vonage. The magistrate judge denied Vonage's motion on the grounds of undue delay and prejudice to Sprint. He noted that Vonage's motion was filed on the last day of discovery in the case over two months after Sprint produced the purportedly 'newly discovered' documents, and implicitly rejected Vonage's justification that it had been busy pursuing follow-up discovery.").
90 See infra notes 93-101 and accompanying text. 91 Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1304 ("Vonage is represented by sophisticated counsel and competent local counsel . . . .").
arguably brought on by a constrained litigation budget. 92 With these caveats, I now turn to the details of the case.
a. Battle of the Experts (or Not)
Perhaps the first-and, surely, one of the most important-strategic gaffes by Vonage's counsel was hiring a non-infringement expert who was arguably unqualified and an invalidity expert with very little relevant knowledge in the field. Specifically, for its non-infringement expert, Vonage hired Joel M. Halpern, a consultant in the field of networking. 93 Although Halpern had extensive experience in the area of ATM and IP networks, 94 as Sprint recognized in a motion to exclude his expert opinions, his expertise encompassed data networking but not traditional telephony, including the PSTN. 95 Because the patents and technology at issue all involved transferring calls between the PSTN and packet networks (such as ATM and IP networks), Vonage's non-infringement expert only had knowledge of half of the equation. 96 Although Sprint's motion to exclude Halpern was not granted, 97 Vonage arguably suffered from his lack of expertise. As discussed below, it appears Vonage failed to introduce important non-infringement arguments at summary judgment and presented a poor case of non-infringement at trial. 98 Vonage's invalidity expert, Frank R. Koperda, had some experience in interfacing traditional telephony platforms with digital networks, but it was in the mid-1980s, more than ten years before the critical date of the patents-in- 92 See Graham, Merges, Samuelson & Sichelman, supra note 28, at 1315 ("Another downside of patents in a startup's competitive environment is the threat of patent disputes and, when negotiation fails, costly litigation. Startups may be particularly sensitive to accusations of infringement because they are likely to experience resource constraints when faced with the costs of funding a suit, estimated for most suits to be between $3 million and $6 million per litigant through appeal."); Malani & Masur, supra note 27, at 654 (noting that a startup's "capital constraints can make a battle with a larger firm very difficult for a startup to win"). Vonage was unable to mount a substantial defense of anticipation or obviousness. 102 Although I have not exhaustively searched for or analyzed the prior art relevant to the patents-in-suit, industry observers indicated that Sprint's patents were likely invalid, and the failure of Vonage to lodge substantial prior art likely seems to be a significant oversight. 103 Despite the ostensive gaps in Vonage's prior art disclosures, because Sprint's patents only disclosed communications technologies in an ATM environment, but the claims in the patents in issue were drafted to cover any type of networkincluding an IP environment-it should at least have been apparent to Vonage's counsel that lack of written description would be a critical defense. 104 In this regard, recall that the enablement requirement demands that the specification "describe how to make and use the invention," while the written description requirement mandates that the specification "show that the inventor actually invented the invention claimed." 105 Although Vonage's counsel apparently recognized the importance of a non-enablement defense-and while Vonage's expert's invalidity report is sealed-other documents show that Vonage's counsel apparently overlooked the lack of written description as a separate defense at summary judgment. 106 In particular, in a response brief to Sprint's motion to exclude the testimony of Vonage's invalidity expert, Vonage's counsel merely discussed enablement, but not written description. 107 Additionally, Vonage's opposition brief to Sprint's motion for partial summary judgment appeared to confuse the indefiniteness and written description doctrines. 108 In the very likely event that Vonage did not lodge a separate defense of written description at summary judgment, this failure appears to be a critical oversight, because the inventor of the patents-in-suit "regarded his invention as being directed to an ATM system rather than including the Internet as a component." 109 Such a statement seems the essence of a lack of "possession" of the "claimed subject matter." 110 In other words, it appears the specification did not describe "the claimed invention with all of its limitations using such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, and formulas that fully set forth the claimed invention." 111 Although "[t]he subject matter of the claim need not be described literally (i.e., using the same terms or in haec verba)," the patents would have needed to disclose sufficient material to "clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize" that the specification related to any type of network, including IP networks. 112 Because the patents' disclosure described "the invention" as relating solely to ATM networks-which was apparently supported by statements from the inventor and other Sprint engineers-and portions of the patents were construed to cover non-ATM networks, it is unlikely that Sprint satisfied the written description requirement. 113 Vonage's apparent failure to mount a solid written description defense was not its only critical omission. In particular, according to the district court, "Vonage built its VoIP telephony system with the technical advice of, and using components purchased from, Cisco." 114 Importantly, Sprint and Cisco had executed an "Alliance Agreement" that provided for the "joint development and ownership of products and intellectual property relating to the asserted patents." 115 In the agreement, "Sprint agreed to license to Cisco . . . patents," including the patents-in-suit, and "covenanted not to sue Cisco customers for infringement of any [licensed] patent." 116 Based on the Sprint-Cisco agreement, Vonage arguably had viable implied license and exhaustion defenses, even before the Supreme Court's opinion in Quanta v.
LG. 117 Yet, inexplicably-although Vonage's counsel had received the Sprint-Cisco agreement two months before the close of discovery-Vonage's counsel waited until the last day of discovery to move to amend its answer to include these defenses. 118 As a result, the magistrate judge rejected Vonage's motion to amend its answer, which the district court subsequently upheld. Vonage's tactical daftness continued at the summary judgment stage. The court began by stating that it "was struck by many . . . deficiencies in Vonage's brief." 120 It noted that a substantial portion of Vonage's brief failed to comply with local rules governing motions for summary judgment, because they were "largely cluttered with improper attorney argument and commentary as well as legal conclusions, none of which are 'facts as would be admissible in evidence.'" 121 Indeed, the court lambasted Vonage for its poorly drafted brief, stating:
It contains mostly argument, attorney commentary, and conclusory statements regarding the patents and technology at issue, with only cursory citations to the record. Vonage's purported "factual" description of the Sprint patents in Section II is actually attorney argument that roughly paraphrases the patent disclosures to support Vonage's contentions in this case and, notably, selectively omits those portions of the patents which do not. . . . Additionally, it is even more troubling because it contains paragraphs, some of which are lengthy, which purport to describe Vonage's technologically complex system with nothing more than a single cursory citation to the record at the end of each paragraph. This makes it virtually impossible for the court to determine what, if any, portions of the record Vonage is relying on to support each of the statements which allegedly describes its system. . . .
. . . Vonage has no legitimate excuse for its decision to ignore these rules, as Vonage is represented by sophisticated counsel and competent local counsel who should be familiar with this court's rules governing summary judgment practice. . . . Accordingly, the court will grant Sprint's motion to the extent that it will largely disregard the arguments set forth in Sections II, III, and IV of Vonage's brief. 122 With the court predisposed to Sprint's arguments-not to mention the court's decision to "largely disregard" most of Vonage's arguments for procedural reasons-the court decided in favor of Sprint on summary judgment for all but its weakest arguments. 123 First, the court incorporated Sprint's hyperbole regarding the importance of the patents-in-suit, stating that the invention in the patents "was significant in that it had the potential to render obsolete major components within the PSTN, breaking the grip that a handful of switch manufacturers held on service providers like Sprint." 124 In reality, the invention appeared to be well known in the art (see below), and the court failed to note that Sprint never even practiced the putatively "significant" patents-in-suit. 125 120 Second, on claim construction issues, the court pointed out repeatedly that Vonage improperly read limitations from the specification into the claim language. 126 Nonetheless, Vonage was successful in its effort to limit the scope of the term "interworking device," which the court interpreted as limited to "an ATM interworking multiplexer." 127 In particular, citing the Federal Circuit's decision in Honeywell International v. ITT Industries, 128 the court narrowed the plain meaning of the term, because it found the common specification of the patents-in-suit described "the invention" as providing "virtual connections through an ATM interworking multiplexer." 129 Vonage's win on "interworking device" set the stage for it to knock out three of seven asserted patents based on non-infringement arguments, because its network operates across IP-not ATM-networks. 130 Clearly, with such an interpretation, there could be no literal infringement of these three patents, and the court was quick to recognize as much. 131 Yet the court found that material disputes of fact remained on the doctrine of equivalents. 132 As an initial matter, Vonage missed an opportunity to eliminate the doctrine of equivalents as a theory of infringement. In particular, under the Supreme Court's decision in Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu, amendments made during patent prosecution typically preclude reliance on the doctrine of equivalents. 133 However, because Vonage raised this argument only in its 126 See Sprint, 500 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-15 ("Given the clarity of the language of the claim terms themselves, then, the court will not import this limitation from the specification into the claims."). After the summary judgment order issued, in a pretrial order, the court construed a number of additional terms and addressed several other arguments. summary judgment reply brief, the court found that it was waived and disregarded it. 134 With the doctrine of equivalents in play, the court found that "Sprint has raised a genuine issue of material fact" of whether Vonage's technology satisfied the standard "function/way/result" test typically used to determine whether an accused product is "equivalent" to the asserted patent claims. 135 Although one could debate whether the court should have held that a reasonable juror could find that the "way" Vonage's gateways worked were substantially the same as that in Sprint's claims, the court noticeably failed to consider whether Sprint effectively disclosed, but failed to claim, "IP interworking devices" in the specifications of the patents-in-suit. 136 This was potentially a critical oversight, because it is black-letter law that "when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedicates that unclaimed subject matter to the public." 137 Although the applicable patents-in-suit did not expressly disclose IP interworking devices, they did disclose the use of the Internet "IP" protocol several times. 138 Moreover, while the advent of full-blown IP gateways was a few years away, IP "interworking devices" were well known in the prior art at the time of the priority date of the patents-in-suit. For example, I located a patent assigned to Motorola filed in 1993 that discloses a telephone that includes an "Interworking Function," which connects it between a traditional PSTN telephone network and a data network. 139 The Motorola patent further discloses connecting the telephone to a TCP/IP network. 140 Although these facts are not decisive, Vonage could have likely made a solid argument that one of skill in the art would have read Sprint's patents at issue to have disclosed, but not claimed, IP interworking devices. 141 Because the claim term was construed as covering only "ATM interworking devices," it seems very likely that Vonage did not present such an argument or evidence on summary judgment, 142 but that had it done so, 143 it might have prevented Sprint from relying on the doctrine of equivalents. 144 As mentioned earlier, it appears that Vonage failed to raise a written description defense on summary judgment. 145 Yet, Vonage likely had a strong defense of lack of written description, because the sole inventor of the patents-in-suit had apparently admitted that he viewed his invention as only applying to ATM, not IP, networks. 146 Although this defense is ultimately a question of fact 147 -presumably, the underlying facts were not genuinely disputed. As such, it seems Vonage made a tactical mistake not arguing for summary judgment of invalidity of all asserted patents on this ground. At the very least, evidence of lack of written description would likely have more favorably colored the judge's findings on non-infringement, particularly the doctrine of equivalents. 148 Of course, the publicly available pleadings indicate that Vonage's counsel did not even recognize written description as a defense separate from non-enablement and indefiniteness, and this potential oversight may explain Vonage's failure to lodge it at summary judgment, not to mention its failure to sufficiently develop the facts to do so. 149 Vonage also failed to raise any anticipation or obviousness defenses at summary judgment. 150 Despite the seemingly wide array of available prior art, Vonage was unable to find anything suitable to support a summary judg-ment motion. 151 This omission is particularly notable because just a few months earlier the Supreme Court had issued its landmark opinion in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 152 providing a firm basis for judges to invalidate patents at the summary judgment stage on grounds of obviousness. 153 If Vonage had further developed what appeared to be a relatively meager collection of prior art, it arguably would have been able to file a strong motion for invalidity due to obviousness. Presumably, part of its failure to do so stemmed from its experts' lack of familiarity with the technology of the patents-in-suit. 154 Vonage's ostensible fumbling at summary judgment is evidenced further by Sprint's success in excluding a number of Vonage's proffered defenses. In particular, the court granted Sprint's motion on Vonage's asserted defense of claim indefiniteness. 155 Indefiniteness at that time was difficult to show because it required that the claims be "insolubly ambiguous," 156 and for this very reason, it was not usually successful as a defense. 157 Not only was the claim language well outside this narrow standard, the district court found that Vonage's expert "report provided no opinion or analysis on this defense." 158 Next, the court easily rejected Vonage's laches, estoppel, acquiescence, misuse, unclean hands, and patentable subject matter defenses, mainly because Vonage introduced no facts that could support them 159 Kan. 2007 ) ("But, the fact that the parties may disagree on the correct meaning of those claim terms does not render them indefinite. The critical point is that Vonage has not directed the court's attention to any particular claim terms that it contends are not amenable to construction, which as explained above is the applicable legal standard for invalidity under § 112, ¶ 2."). . 2001)) ). Since that time, the Supreme Court has weakened the standard for indefiniteness, holding that "a patent is invalid for indefiniteness if its claims, read in light of the specification delineating the patent, and the prosecution history, fail to inform, with reasonable certainty, those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention." Nautilus, Inc. also because the court prevented Vonage from relying on the Sprint-Cisco licensing agreement. 160 In this regard, the court pointed out Vonage's confusion between a laches defense, which relates to when suit is filed, and a prosecution laches defense, which relates to the amount of time a patentee spends prosecuting its patent. 161 Additionally, the court chastised Vonage once again for its failure to meet imposed deadlines:
The court might be willing to put the parties to this inconvenience if Vonage had offered a legitimate justification for its belated reliance on the prosecution histories as the basis for its laches defense. Significantly, however, Vonage has not done so. In this respect, it is important to note that Vonage's approach to this issue is not unique. Rather, it is entirely typical of the manner in which Vonage has approached the entire pretrial phase of this case. Vonage has repeatedly raised arguments in a belated fashion and has engaged in tactics which the court believes are designed to delay the trial of this case. Its overall approach leads the court to believe that either (1) Vonage has not adequately prepared this case for trial, or (2) Vonage is attempting to benefit from "hide-the-ball" tactics. The court discounts the likelihood that Vonage is unprepared, as Vonage is represented by counsel who are undoubtedly well versed in patent litigation as well as the disclosure and supplementation requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, the court can only conclude that Vonage's belated assertion of this patent prosecution defense theory must have been a strategic litigation decision. 162 As some consolation, the court did leave intact Vonage's marking defense because, although Sprint did not practice the patents, its licensee Cisco possibly did. 163 Of course, because Vonage could not introduce evidence of the Sprint-Cisco licensing agreement, its win here was essentially moot. 164 And while Vonage's non-infringement expert was perhaps a poor hire-and apparently did not even possess skill in the art that he set out as applicable in his own expert report 165 -the court, perhaps taking pity on 160 Id. at 1335-36 ("Vonage explains that it cannot present this evidence in support of its opposition to Sprint's motion for summary judgment because Magistrate Judge Waxse struck from the pretrial order all references to the Sprint/Cisco agreements, including Vonage's contentions in support of its defense of estoppel."). 161 See id. at 1337 ("The court will assume, without deciding, that Vonage's assertion of a general laches defense in its amended answers was sufficient to also set forth the defense of prosecution laches. Even so, it is important to note that the factual underpinnings of these two defenses are quite distinct."). Vonage at this point in the opinion, decided nonetheless that he passed Daubert muster. 166 In sum, Vonage failed to raise or waived not just one, but several seemingly strong defenses at summary judgment. Its behavior was so notable that the court rebuked Vonage for its "cursory citations," selective omissions, "decision to ignore the[ ] rules," "belated" arguments, and "hide-the-ball tactics." 167 Sprint, on the other hand, won on most of the issues it raised, eliminating a large number of potential defenses from the case. With such a onesided result, the parties headed into trial with the odds strongly favoring Sprint.
d. Vonage's Trial Loss and Ultimate Settlement
At trial, Vonage was in a precarious situation. In addition to losing key arguments at summary judgment, Vonage lost potentially decisive issues in an important pretrial order construing further claim terms and rejecting its prosecution history estoppel arguments. 168 Ultimately, the jury found infringement of all fourteen claims at issue in six different patents and held none of the claims were invalid. 169 It awarded $69.5 million in damages for past infringement at a 5% reasonable royalty rate, which applied to future sales. 170 Sprint then moved to modify the judgment to include an injunction against future infringement. 171 Before the court ruled, the parties settled for an estimated $80 million. 172 Presumably, part of the settlement was driven by a set of patents that Vonage purchased from Digital Packet Licensing, which had a pending infringement suit against Sprint, as well as AT&T and Nortel Networks. 173 Before settlement, there were reports that Sprint might purchase Vonage as part of settling the case, but no deal was consummated. 174 
Verizon v. Vonage
The Verizon suit was similar in many ways to the Sprint suit. 175 After Vonage had taken away hundreds of thousands of Verizon subscribers, 176 Verizon sued Vonage for patent infringement in June 2006 in the so-called "rocket docket" of the Eastern District of Virginia. 177 The seven patents at issue covered gateway interfaces between packet-switched networks, like the Internet, and circuit-switched networks, like the PSTN; 178 billing and fraud detection; 179 call forwarding and voicemail; 180 and the use of Wi-Fi cordless handsets on a VoIP network. 181 In the midst of discovery and pretrial disputes, the parties briefed claim construction issues. 182 Overall, the district court construed the disputed claim terms broadly. 183 A few days later the court denied both parties summary judgment. 184 Unfortunately, a copy of the order is neither available from the federal courts' PACER database nor Westlaw or Lexis. However, based on a review of the docket in the case, Vonage apparently filed only a summary judgment motion of non-infringement, but not invalidity. 185 In this regard, Vonage hired the same invalidity expert as in the Sprint case, Frank Koperda, who as I recounted earlier had some experience in interfacing traditional telephony platforms with digital networks, but not since the mid-1980s. 186 Like the Sprint case, presumably Koperda's lack of recent experience weakened Vonage's invalidity case. 187 After a several week trial, the jury found that Vonage infringed three of Verizon's patents. Overall, it awarded $58 million in reasonable royalties for past infringement and a 5.5% royalty rate on future sales. 188 Subsequently, the court granted an injunction against future infringement, 189 which the Federal Circuit subsequently stayed pending appeal. 190 On appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld claim constructions on two of the three patents, affirmed the findings of infringement and validity, and reversed and remanded on one of the patents. 191 With the injunction in place from the two infringed patents, Vonage decided to settle the case for between $80 and $120 million. 192 
AT&T v. Vonage
After Vonage had settled the suits filed by Sprint and Verizon, totaling over $160 million, 193 less than one month later, AT&T launched a suit against it in another rocket docket, the Western District of Wisconsin. 194 Like the Sprint patents, AT&T's patent disclosed telephony across an ATM network but contained claims not expressly limited to any type of network. 195 (Because I represented Vonage in this matter, I have chosen to refrain from a detailed analysis of infringement, invalidity, and enforceability.) Although at least some industry observers believed that Vonage had a strong defense of non-infringement and invalidity, 196 it quickly settled the case for about $40 million. 197 Presumably, Vonage had become skeptical by that point of its ability to convince judges and juries that the patents asserted against it were invalid or unenforceable, or that its technology was sufficiently different from traditional packet networks, like ATM networks, so as not to infringe. Assuming as much, Vonage's decision to settle was certainly understandable.
C. The Aftermath of the Trilogy and Subsequent Cases
Following the settlements of roughly $200 million, 198 which was about one quarter of Vonage's annual revenue at the time, 199 Vonage's marketing expenditures decreased and its subscriber growth slowed substantially. 200 Indeed, Vonage was almost delisted from the New York Stock Exchange, 201 and some observers predicted bankruptcy. 202 From the time of Vonage's IPO (about seven months after the Sprint suit was filed) through the AT&T settlement, its stock price declined from $17 per share to about $2 per share. 203 Although other factors certainly accounted for the decline, 204 the trilogy of lawsuits arguably played a major role, particularly given the substantial declines in Vonage's stock price following unfavorable rulings in the cases. 205 The highly damaging effects imposed on Vonage by the patent bully carriers stand in contrast to the relative minor effects of a series of suits filed against Vonage before and afterward by a variety of non-practicing entities (NPEs). Overall, Vonage was involved in three different NPE suits around the time of the trilogy, all of which settled. 206 However, unlike the suits filed by the incumbent carriers, none of the NPEs extracted a large toll from Vonage. 207 So, at least for Vonage, the "bullies" inflicted much more damage than the "trolls."
Furthermore, Vonage did not fare so well in the infringement suits involving patents it purchased to fend off Sprint. In those suits, Digital Packet Licensing-the original plaintiff-sued Sprint, AT&T, Nortel, MCI, and others. 208 After Vonage acquired the patents, Nortel shrewdly asserted a number of patents of its own against Vonage. 209 Ultimately, the cases settled with Vonage and Nortel licensing their patents to each other for no fee, 210 and Vonage appeared to collect little to nothing from the other defendants. 211 Of course, Vonage likely spent millions in litigation fees on the cases. 212 CONCLUSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRILOGY AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER STUDY As I have recounted, Vonage-a startup company providing a highly competitive, low-cost telephone service that drew millions of subscribers away from the incumbent carriers-did not fare well in the U.S. patent system. 213 Most importantly, Vonage paid out roughly $200 million in settlement amounts, plus millions in attorneys' fees, placing it at the brink of insolvency. 214 Although Vonage ultimately escaped the "death penalty," its value decreased precipitously, and the suits very likely caused permanent damage to the health of the company. 215 One might quip, if Vonage lost its Sprint and Verizon cases, then the payout was deserved. However, as I describe above, much of Vonage's woes in the Sprint case appeared to stem from tactical errors. 216 Presumably, those errors were driven in large part by Vonage's limited litigation budget and inexperience in patent suits, especially compared with Sprint's very large budget and extensive litigation experience. 217 These sorts of differentials among litigants highlight a problem in the patent bullying context not present in the patent troll context-namely, that patent bullies not only can force settlements in weak cases, but in fact can win at judgment in weak cases. 218 The ability of patent bullies to achieve such results, of course, compounds the distortions already present in patent litigation and licensing. 219 Indeed, the so-called "trolls"-which were much smaller than Sprint and Verizon-did not achieve results as favorable against Vonage. 220 Nor do trolls use litigation to acquire competitors at bargain basement prices-which Sprint apparently considered. 221 Furthermore, when Vonage attempted to cash out on its patents against Nortel Networks, it was smacked right back, and ultimately settled for nothing. 222 Generalizing from the Vonage trilogy, a few important problems for the patent system as a whole emerge. First, like the trolls, patent bullies can take advantage of high litigation costs and the complexity of patent litigation to 213 209-212. gain leverage in suits over smaller defendants. 223 Importantly, this leverage can stem from bullies' increased odds of winning otherwise "weak" suits. 224 And, unlike the troll context, patent bullies will ordinarily be entitled to injunctions. 225 Coupled with the high risk aversion of many small defendants, these advantages can place extreme pressure on defendants to settle, or result in inaccurate judgments, leading to substantial economically distorting effects. 226 Second, also unlike the troll context, settlements and judgments with bullies do not only result in money changing hands. Rather, bullies often desire to acquire a smaller competitor's technology, either through a coerced license or a forced purchase of the competitor's entire company. 227 Arguably, these results can wreak even more damage on the competitive environment than suits by trolls. 228 
